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Abstract— Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure have been an issue of importance in industry over the past several 
years, as well as a focus of academic research. Cyber attacks of various types and magnitude have been on the rise target-
ed specifically at power grids. A successful attack on the power grid could result in significant impacts including grid 
shutdown, cascading failures, damage to the infrastructure, and potential harm to people. Power grid infrastructure are 
critical in nature; they enable operations for residential, commercial, industrial, and government users across critical 
infrastructure such as water, communication, banking, transportation, manufacturing, and more. The compromise of 
these operations introduces threats, which span from economic to public safety. The Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
(AMI) is now being rapidly deployed throughout the power grid, and is an enabling technology for smart grid. Identifying 
the attack surface is a necessary step in achieving cyber security in smart grids and AMI. The purpose of this paper is to 
quantify and examine the cyber attack surface of AMI in order to lay the foundation for mitigating approaches to AMI 
cyber security.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The security of Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) has recently become an area of interest as its deployment 
has grown. The affinity towards AMI by utility companies, energy markets, and regulators is primarily to facilitate 
near real-time collection of power flow and usage data. This will allow utilities to provide dynamic pricing services, 
demand response, and perform better management of the power grid, although these new abilities increase the attack 
surface [1,2]. Smart meters are installed at homes, buildings, and other facilities of the power consumer and thus, the 
vast number in deployment will be in the many of millions [3,4].  
Like any nascent system, AMI have yet to establish security measures to handle cyber attacks beyond rudimentary 
measures commonly employed in general, e.g., network encryption. A cyber attack is an attempt by hackers to dam-
age or destroy a computer network or system. Attacks can vary in complexity, magnitude, and impact. A cyber at-
tack on AMI may involve intelligence gathering, infecting the target AMI systems, AMI exploitation, exfiltration of 
data from various attack points of AMI, and maintaining control [5,6,7]. The cyber attack surface can be defined by 
the methods an environment or a system can be attacked by an adversary to introduce or retrieve data from that envi-
ronment or system. A targeted attack on AMI could potentially result in shutdown of the power grid, disabling ener-
gy delivery systems [8]. This could have devastating effects on government, trade, commerce, banking, transporta-
tion and other important aspects, which rely on energy to operate [2]. A compromise of AMI may also result in an 
invasion of privacy [9], and provide a surface from which to extract information from users such as Internet activity, 
financial, or health records.  
Cyber security of AMI was recently a topic of major interest at a Black Hat conference where some vulnerabilities 
and simulated attacks were demonstrated [10]. Yi et al [11] demonstrated a specific denial of service attack where an 
attacker may select any node and disrupt traffic on the AMI network. Attackers may also compromise a smart meter 
to change energy usage data or fabricate other meter data [12]. Cleveland [13] discussed an example of a possible 
scenario of a smart hacker cracking AMI security and sending 5 million remote disconnect commands. Attacks on 
critical infrastructure in general have been on the rise and a survey [14] conducted by McAfee indicates in one 
year’s time that one in four have been the victims of cyber extortion or threatened cyber extortion; denial of service 
attacks had increased from 50% to 80% of respondents; and approximately two-thirds have found malware designed 
to sabotage their systems. 
The key contribution of this paper is the timely study of the AMI attack surface given the rapid deployment of AMI. 
As of 2012, over 43 million smart meters have been installed in the U.S., 89% of which are residential with the re-
mainder to commercial and industrial consumers [4]. According to the Institute for Electric Efficiency smart meter 
deployment projections, approximately 65 million smart meters will be deployed in the U.S. by 2015 [3]. The cost 
of AMI is huge given this scale, and frequent replacement with more secure units is extremely cost prohibitive. This 
research adds value in a concurrent way by aiding understanding of AMI cyber security exposure, which enables 
utilities to be more informed regarding the security posture of AMI. 
 
II. PREVIOUS WORK IN AMI ATTACK SURFACE 
Security concerns with respect to the power grid resulted in a set of compliance standards developed by the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). These are the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards, 
which was a first step towards the cyber security compliance regulations for power grids [15]. These standards pri-
marily focus on the identification and protection of cyber critical assets in the power grid infrastructure. NIST has 
also developed a set of standards for the interoperability of assets comprising the smart power grid, i.e., Framework 
and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards [16], which briefly addresses the need for cyber security 
standards and the components of these standards. An overall strategy for implementing cyber security in AMI is also 
presented in Chapter 6 of this text, but only from a generalist point of view and with no analysis of the attack surface 
or specific vulnerabilities. 
Schukat [17] attempts to achieve a holistic view of the cyber threat landscape in smart grid infrastructure. His re-
search focused on Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication, the role of PKI, and authentication protocols used 
for mitigating cyber risk. He discusses that energy systems are going through a paradigm shift towards better and 
smarter solutions driven by factors like economic cost, efficiency, environmental impact, etc. The smarter the sys-
tems get, the more complex they got. He argues that the IP-based systems and open standards in the modern energy 
systems, whilst beneficial for many reasons, pose potential risk to the attack surface of energy systems.  
Hahn and Govindarasu [18] proposed a security model, which is capable of representing various privilege states and 
discusses the various attack paths an attacker could take. Using this model, they attempted to produce an exposure 
metric that could help evaluate the completeness of security mechanisms in place in the smart grid. They discussed 
the necessity to support the grid and its security mechanisms in place through developing a security model, which 
would concentrate on the critical information necessary to protect the grid. They also mentioned that the complexity 
of the AMI infrastructure and constrained network bandwidth could limit the security monitoring. Their proposed 
exposure analysis algorithm could be used to quantify the exposure of the information objects within the smart grid. 
Though their paper could be helpful in providing quantitative metrics to evaluate risk in smart grids, it does not 
thoroughly discuss the complete surface attack of AMI. 
Searle and McParland [19] at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory attempted to provide a non-proprietary in-
sight into the AMI systems and smart meters within AMI. He further discusses some security issues and vulnerabili-
ties that could lead to potential attacks. Accordingly, studying both the components of AMI systems and the higher 
architecture will promote meaningful and open understanding of the cyber security risks involved by installing smart 
meters in HAN [19]. Though this paper briefly discusses the architecture and components of AMI, its primary focus 
is limited to potential cyber attacks at the HAN level, a thorough discussion of the Smart Energy Profile (SEP), and 
security vulnerabilities in the communication standards. 
   
III. AMI AS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The AMI is the point of interface between the utility power provider and the end consumer of power. As such, it is a 
critical point in the power delivery system. The AMI can provide valuable information to the utility including real-
time voltages, currents, power flow, power factor, etc., as well as tracking accumulated power usage by the consum-
er for billing purposes. The AMI also provides power control by connecting and disconnecting the consumer from 
the power grid. Attacks that compromise the integrity of the AMI can result in a loss of situational awareness and 
even control of the power grid by utilities [2]. Such attacks also have the potential to cut power from consumers, 
which include homeowners, businesses, hospitals, and other critical infrastructure such as water and telecommunica-
tions [2]. The deployment scale of AMI results in many thousands to millions of users within a power utility’s net-
work, so the potential for widespread disruption and harm is significant.  
Illustrated in Fig. 1 is an example of a power grid network topology. The AMI is intimately integrated with the pow-
er delivery process and the power grid, which is comprised of physical devices, such as transformers and circuit 
breakers. Disruption in AMI can create instability in this physical process potentially damaging equipment and caus-
ing physical harm to individuals utilizing the power grid. Smart meters comprising the AMI are distributed through-
out a metropolitan area, usually serving thousands to millions of users. The effects of attacks can even migrate to 
other utilities and metropolitan areas, perhaps even on a national scale.  
 
Figure 1 – Power grid network topology. 
Types of attacks that are directed at the power grid itself include the following: 
• Denial of Power (DoP) – Attacks on individual smart meters to deny power service to a consumer. This 
type of attack could be directed at critical users resulting in significant harm. 
• Theft of Power (ToP) – Attacks on individual smart meters to facilitate theft of power from the utility. Con-
sumers that are purposefully disconnected from the power utility may surreptitiously re-connect to obtain 
power. The data within a smart meter may also be altered to misrepresent power usage on any number of 
smart meters. 
• Disruption of Grid (DoG) – If a large group of smart meters are compromised, they can be connected and 
disconnected in rapid or chaotic sequences, which results in instability in the power grid. On a large enough 
scale, the power grid will be unable to absorb this transient behavior and may partially fail resulting in 
widespread power loss. 
 
IV. AMI ATTACK SURFACE 
A. Smart Meters 
Smart meters are the primary point of data collection for power grid energy consumption. They facilitate a dense and 
large-scale metrology of the power grid operating characteristics of voltage, frequency, power factor, etc. Lastly, 
smart meters also facilitate the automated connection and disconnection of consumers to the power grid. Figure 2 
illustrates the block diagram of a typical smart meter with potential attack vectors.  
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Figure 2 – Typical smart meter block diagram. 
The design of the smart meter incorporates two network communication radios, and often a local infrared serial port 
for maintenance. This results in a broadened attack surface. Physical access to the meter adds another attack surface 
since internal serial links are typically unsecured and based on common protocols. Essentially, every smart meter 
becomes a multi-network terminal on the AMI information network. The microcontroller, radios, and firmware are 
driven by low cost, and as such minimal capability, since most utilities will need to purchase smart meters by the 
millions. Smart meters send usage statistics to utility companies at a relatively high refresh rate of minutes to se-
conds. Coupled with their vast number in deployment, an immense flood of big data is made available to the utili-
ties. This enables dashboarding of power grid operation, automated operation and recovery, dynamic pricing, and 
more usage-based services to the consumer, but at the cost of privacy and vulnerability to cyber physical attacks.  
B. AMI Information / Communication Network 
The AMI communications network is primarily comprised of the smart meter, the Smart Meter Data Collector 
(SMDC), and the network linking these, typically a wireless Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) mesh or 
other cellular network. The AMI information network also includes the link to the Home Area Network (HAN) on 
the consumer side, typically WiFi or ZigBee®, and the link to utility’s WAN, typically Ethernet infrastructure. The 
AMI communications network is geographically distributed throughout a metropolitan area alongside the power 
grid. The scale of this network can consist of hundreds to thousands of SMDC, each capable of serving thousands of 
smart meters, thus many thousands to a few millions. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 with potential attack vectors. 
 
Figure 3 – AMI information network. 
The vast number of devices coupled with the simplicity of individual smart meters results in a huge network of high-
ly similar actors that are typically ill equipped to handle cyber security technologies for attack prevention. Another 
complication given the cost of deploying such a large number of devices is that devices are expected to have a long 
lifetime, perhaps twenty years or more, which means that hardware will remain constant for long periods of time. 
This contributes to a long lifetime for vulnerabilities even once known since upgrades are difficult or limited in 
scope. Therefore, the compromise of even a single smart meter through focused attack or reverse engineering poten-
tially provides access to the AMI network as a whole. It is also interesting to note in Fig. 3 that the Internet bounds 
the AMI information network on both sides. This, coupled with the extensive use of multiple wireless technologies 
and geographic dispersion, results in an attack surface of unprecedented scale. 
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C. Home Area Network 
The HAN is the consumer side of AMI. The HAN begins with a wireless link, typically ZigBee, from the smart me-
ter to a consumer gateway device in the home. The consumer gateway also acts as a bridge between the smart meter 
ZigBee network and the consumer’s home devices, such as smart appliances and energy monitors. The consumer 
gateway will incorporate the ZigBee and Wi-Fi radios in addition to a Linux microkernel computer, usually contain-
ing an embedded web server. The gateway collects energy usage data, network status and text messages from the 
utility for display to the consumer on the gateway itself or a remote monitor. The gateway also forwards demand-
response and energy-pricing signals to the smart appliances for their information. This gateway may also serve a 
connection to smart appliances, whose operating parameters can be influenced by the smart meter. For example, 
smart clothes dryer can be configured to dry clothes only when the price or demand for energy is low.  
 
Figure 4 – Consumer gateway in AMI network. 
The motivation for consumers to participate is additional energy cost savings in an intelligent, automated, and real-
time approach. The consequence of this benefit is a new attack surface through these embedded devices, which typi-
cally have reduced processing power to incorporate sufficient cyber attack mitigating technologies. 
The HAN is also the network that interfaces with the consumer’s home computing systems and Internet connection. 
Consumers will likely want to monitor and collect information, perhaps even enabling Internet access by the utility 
for advanced energy usage statistics on individual appliances, or by themselves to remotely control appliances when 
away from home. A compromise of the HAN side of AMI has the potential to disrupt the lives of consumers on an 
intimate level, physically within their home, and provides an access point back to the Internet. This model also ex-
tends to commercial and industrial users who want the same capabilities for their enterprise. Fig. 5 demonstrates 
some of the probable attacks through the HAN side of AMI. 
 
Figure 5 – HAN devices and probable attacks. 
D. Smart Meter Data Collectors and Head End 
The Smart Meter Data Collector (SMDC) is a hardware computing device, based on a Linux microkernel, that ag-
gregate the massive real-time data from a bank of smart meters by providing a collection and management point for 
the utility. Typically, a few thousand smart meters are managed per SMDC utilizing multiple FHSS mesh radios. 
The SMDC then provides a link directly to the utility via hardwired Ethernet or some other WAN backbone. The 
SMDC is usually responsible for cryptographic key management for the smart meters as well. Their position in the 
AMI information network is illustrated in Fig. 3 and the block diagram for a typical SMDC is shown in Fig. 6. The 
SMDC is subject to the same types of attacks as the smart meter. 
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Figure 6 – Smart meter data collector. 
The AMI Head-End (AMI-HE) is the AMI management platform at the utility installation. The AMI-HE centralizes 
management of the whole AMI and provides data warehousing for all collected data. This is also the interface point 
for the utility infrastructure from which billing, Outage Management Systems (OMS) for restoration, Energy and 
Distribution Management Systems (EMS/DMS) for dispatch and system monitoring, and Meter Data Management 
Systems (MDMS) from which other AMI management functions derive. The AMI-HE is typically wholly contained 
within the corporate WAN as an enterprise computing platform and as such, is secured by typical cyber security 
policies practiced in corporate systems. As such, the focus of this paper will remain within the AMI information 
network depicted in Fig. 3. 
E. Protocols and Software  
As illustrated in Fig. 3, AMI utilizes several different communication links and subsequently, several protocols, all 
of which provide an attack surface. AMI is enabled through the ANSI C12.22 standards, which define data messag-
ing standards for smart meter AMI networks. The protocol describes transporting C12.19 table data [20] for interop-
erability among AMI devices with AES encryption. The attack surface of this protocol includes weak encryption, 
key discovery through reverse engineering or physical access, as in Figs. 2 and 6, which affords access to the data 
tables allowing reconfiguration, data collection/corruption and other control functions. 
The ZigBee Alliance’s Smart Energy Profile 2.0 Public Application Protocol Specification (SEP 2.0) [21] is a set of 
interoperability standards to connect consumer-side HAN devices to the smart grid. Illustrated in Fig. 7, is an illus-
tration of the SEP 2.0 stack and potential attacks on its attack surface.  
 
Figure 7 – SEP attack surface, adapted from [22,23]. 
Many software tools for hacking and cracking AMI are becoming prevalent such as the KillerBee framework and 
toolset [24]. The framework allows users to build their own tools for eavesdropping, emulating devices, etc. for ex-
ploiting ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.4 networks. 
Grochocki et al [25] investigated attacks on the smart meter to data collector (SMDC) mesh radio network, includ-
ing the development of an attack tree. Some of these attacks have been illustrated in Fig. 6 on the SMDC itself. The 
attack surface of the RF communication link is of particular interest since the SMDC interfaces with many thou-
sands of smart meters and access to the device can be easily obtained physically through Ethernet and unsecured 
serial as well as medium range RF where radios are readily available to facilitate such attacks, e.g., WiMAX, 3G/4G 
LTE, cellular, etc. 
It should be noted that many AMI devices rely on secret communication codes and algorithms embedded in the 
hardware with the hope of maintaining security through obscurity [25]. There has been some difficulty in coopera-
tion between vendors and cyber-security researchers in an effort to protect intellectual property and competitiveness. 
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However, physical and/or RF access to the smart meters and SMDCs can expose these codes with some knowledge 
of hardware and reverse engineering [11]. Once exposed, the obscurity aspect is negated, along with any security 
afforded. According to a researcher at IOActive, all it takes for an attacker to gain command and control over a 
smart meter is $500 worth of equipment and materials and a background in electronics and software engineering 
[11]. This could mean en masse manipulation of service to residential and business facilities.  
 
V. MOTIVATION OF ATTACKERS 
Motivation is an important factor in order to understand and respond to cyber attacks. Cyber attacks targeted to-
wards AMI are usually motivated by terrorism to disrupt a nation’s critical infrastructure. Even casual crack-
ers/hackers seeking to test their skills are attracted to such a prominent target. Industrial espionage and other busi-
ness disruptions, whether politically motivated or not, are another key motivation. Additionally, some attacks may 
seek to utilize AMI as a launching point for other Internet attacks by virtue of the vast number of devices, their abil-
ity to initiate many-pronged attacks, and even their ability to hide malicious or criminal data through dispersion 
among many nodes [26]. According to research by Ponemon, the organizations managing the U.S. critical infrastruc-
ture facilities are not well prepared for the attacks, if any take place [27]. All nations are vulnerable without making 
the smart meters resilient. Smart meters have been game changers for cyber attackers, affording them a rich new 
resource for widespread disruption [28].  
Beyond the DoP, ToP, and DoG attacks on the power grid introduced in Section III, symptoms of AMI network at-
tacks include: unauthorized web pages posted on Internet-connected web servers collecting data, outbound data 
transmissions using unknown protocols and ports, huge compressed file transmissions over AMI networks, unusual 
data load between data collectors and the smart meters, and unusual log entries.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
AMI is an enabling technology for new initiatives in electrical power and its deployment plays an intimate role in 
electrical power delivery. Given the recent paradigm shift towards rapid and large-scale deployment, the attack sur-
face is rapidly increasing. AMI equipment vendors have also taken an approach largely based on closed and proprie-
tary security solutions in a false effort to maintain security, which deters evaluation and further research by the sci-
entific community – although there are signs that this trend is slowing changing towards open standards [29]. A 
cyber security roadmap for AMI systems can be architected only with complete understanding of the attack surface 
of AMI. It has been demonstrated that a compromised AMI can severely disrupt the power grid and all critical infra-
structure that rely on power. It is important to note that AMI is a global initiative with eventual deployment in any 
nation with a managed power grid. The first step in mitigating these attacks is to catalog the devices and protocols in 
order to scope the attack surface. This will establish the knowledge required to begin the process of reducing this 
attack surface through resiliency of the exposed points. In this paper, the attack surface has been established with the 
inclusion of some of the most prominent attack vectors into this surface.  
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